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Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals
MARSHA GARRISON*
The half or more of American children who will be eligible for child
support at some point during their minority' are at serious risk. Close
to 50 percent of families receiving federal welfare benefits become
eligible for benefits as a result of marital separation or divorce.2 More
than half of children in mother-only households are poverty-stricken;
in black and Hispanic mother-only households, more than two-thirds
are poor.3 Children in single-parent households are also more likely to
experience poor health, behavioral problems, delinquency, and low
educational attainment than are their peers in intact families. As adults
they have higher rates of poverty, early childbearing, and divorce.4
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Researchers currently estimate that half to three-quarters of children born in the
late 1970s or 1980s will spend some portion of their childhood years in a single-parent
household. For a critical review of the estimates, see DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, AMER-
ICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM FAMILY, GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 69-
71 (1993). As many as 90% of African-American children will spend time in a single-
parent family. See ROBERT H. HAVEMAN & BARBARA WOLFE, SUCCEEDING
GENERATIONS: ON THE EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 19 n.2 (1994).
2. See Welfare: Who Gets It? How Much Does It Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, March 23,
1995, at A23 (reporting, based on 1994 GREENBOOK data, that 45% of families going
on AFDC rolls did so as a result of divorce or separation, 30% as a result of the birth
of a child to an unmarried woman); PETER J. LEAHY et al., lime on Welfare: Why Do
People Enter and Leave the System, 54 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 33 (1995) (reporting
change in family structure as the primary reason women enter welfare system).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993 470-71 tbls. 737, 740 (1993) (showing that 55% of
children in mother-only households were poor in 1991, and that 67.9% of black and
70.4% of Hispanic children age six in such households were poor).
4. For summaries of the research, see HERNANDEZ, supra note 1, at 58-64; S. Wayne
Duncan, Economic Impact of Divorce on Children's Development: Current Findings
and Policy Implications, 23 J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCH. 444 (1994); Sara McLanahan,
Intergenerational Consequences of Divorce: The United States Perspective, in ECo-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 285 (Lenore
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Inadequate child support greatly increases the risks associated with
familial separation. While the poor outcomes associated with growing
up in a single-parent household do not result solely from reduced eco-
nomic status, this factor appears to be the most important of the iden-
tifiable causes. 5 Support awards and payments also affect the com-
parative well-being of family members. Indeed, under traditional,
discretionary support standards, researchers reported that divorce typ-
ically produced an improvement in the living standard of the nonresi-
dential parent, while that of his child and the residential parent plum-
meted.6
Over the past twenty years, the federal and state governments have
enacted a series of laws designed to raise the level of support awards
and payments.7 While this law reform effort has altered many aspects
of child support practice, the most sweeping shift has been in the de-
termination of child support values. Traditional support laws required
consideration of the child's needs, prior standard of living, and parental
resources, but left to judicial discretion the task of translating these
factors into a dollar value.8 Today, based on directives from Congress, 9
each state has adopted numerical guidelines under which support
awards are calculated. 1
While Congress adopted the numerical guideline requirement with
the primary aim of significantly increasing award levels,"' the available
J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds. 1992); Sara McLanahan et al., The Role of Mother-
Only Families in Reproducing Poverty, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 51-78 (Aletha C. Huston ed. 1991).
5. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 3, 79-94 (1994) (describing research and con-
cluding that "[1]ow income-and the sudden drop in income that often is associated
with divorce-is the single most important factor in children's lower achievement in
single-parent homes, accounting for about half of the disadvantage"); Sara McLanahan,
supra note 4, at 292-93, 298 (summarizing studies).
6. For a description of the research findings under discretionary standards, see
Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 621, 633 n. 43 (living
standards) & 721 tbl. 56 (per capita income) (1991).
7. The trend is not unique to the United States. See J. Thomas Oldham, Lessonsfrom the New English and Australian Child Support Systems, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 691 (1996).
8. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 488-98 (1968), for a description of traditional child support law.
9. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(1988)).
10. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(f), 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1991)). The guidelines need establish only a rebuttable pre-
sumption as to the value of support. For state-by-state descriptions of the guidelines,
see DIANE DODSON & JOAN ENTMACHER, WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, REPORT
CARD ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (1994); CLAIRE B. GRIMM & JANICE
MUNSTERMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES (1991).
11. See Irwin Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in
Family Law Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24
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evidence suggests that this goal has not been met. Although the guide-
lines do appear to have modestly increased the value of new support
awards, 12 increases reported to date fall far short of those predicted. 3
In some states, award levels did not increase at all after guidelines were
introduced; in others, award levels increased only within one or another
income group.' n Many guidelines also fail to ensure that children are
protected from poverty, even when parental income is adequate to meet
that goal; 15 typically they continue to produce awards that improve the
living standard of the child support obligor, while that of his child
significantly declines.1 6 Today's child support laws thus prefer the in-
terests of the nonresident parent to those of the child, the other parent,
and the public.
Because federal law requires each state to review its guidelines at
least once every four years, 17 a mechanism is already in place to im-
prove current results. However, state policymakers need better infor-
mation about why early guidelines have had so little effect and new
models better designed to ensure that children do not bear the brunt
FAM. L.Q. 157, 160-62 (1990); Robert G. Williams, An Overview of Child Support
Guidelines in the United States, in CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: THE NEXT GENERA-
TION 15 (Margaret Campbell Haynes ed., 1994) [hereinafter NEXT GENERATION].
12. The largest and most detailed study to date is described in Nancy Thoennes et
al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Variability,
and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 339-40, 343 (1991)(in only one
which had the lowest pre-guideline award levels of three research states did all income
groups experience significant increases in the level of child support attributable to the
introduction of mandatory guidelines; in one state no income group did). See also
Marsha Garrison, Child Support and Children's Poverty-A Review of SMALL CHANGE:
THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT AND AMERICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM
FAMILY, GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 489-90 (1994) (de-
scribing and analyzing studies).
13. RON HASKINS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ESTIMATES
OF NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION POTENTIAL AND THE INCOME SECURITY
OF FEMALE HEADED FAMLIES, 29 (1985) (predicting that application of either of two
guideline models would increase value of average child support 350%); Irwin Garfinkel
et al., Child Support Guidelines: Will They Make a Difference?, 12 J. FAM. ISSUES 404
(1991) (predicting that introduction of guidelines would raise award values by 44%).
14. Thoennes et al., supra note 12, at 336 (in Illinois, guidelines did not signifi-
cantly increase award levels among any income group when differences in employment
status of pre- and post-guideline samples were taken into account). A significant pro-
portion of the increase in average child support values that researchers have noted may
also be due to the imposition of token, rather than zero-dollar, awards in cases of
unemployed or female noncustodial parents. P. BUSHARD, TIME SERIES IMPACT AS-
SESSMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: SUPPORT AWARDS IN SHARED CUSTODY
DIVORCES (1988) (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) cited in Thoennes et
al., supra note 12, at 343 (15% increase in support levels in shared custody cases after
adoption of Arizona child support guidelines was entirely due to a reduction in zero-
dollar awards).
15. See sources cited in notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
16. See DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 98.
17. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(e).
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of family dissolution. This article describes the reasons for the failure
of early guidelines, examines the goals support guidelines might seek
to achieve and the extent to which they are realizable, and then eval-
uates current guideline models in light of those goals and possibilities.
I. Why Have Efforts to Improve
Child Support Outcomes Had So Little Effect?
A. The Guidelines' Basic Design
A major reason why the guidelines have not had more impact on
award levels is simply that the formulae most states adopted fail to
produce awards much higher than those achieved under discretionary
standards; most of the formulae also fail to produce awards high enough
to protect children from either poverty or a dramatic decline in living
standard. One review, which evaluated all state guidelines in effect in
1989-90, concluded that none required lower-income obligors to pro-
vide enough child support to ensure a poverty-level or "minimum de-
cent living" standard for two children. 18 A significant number of states
also failed to ensure that children in middle-income families enjoyed a
minimum decent living.19 Moreover, awards calculated under the
guidelines produced a dramatic decline in children's living standard as
compared to that of the nonresidential parent. On average, awards under
18. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 37. See also Ellen B. Zweibel &
Richard Shillington, Child Support Policy: Income Tax Treatment and Child Support
Guidelines (1994), in CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION
TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 972, 978, tbl. 4.1 (1996)
(reporting that under both income shares and Melson formulas more than 75% of low-
income custodial parents would have incomes below poverty line); Maureen A. Pirog-
Good, Child Support Guidelines and the Economic Well-Being of Children in the United
States, 42 FAM. REL. 453, 459 (1993) (using one estimate of family expenditure for
low-income family, guidelines in 14 states failed to produce an adequate award; using
another estimate all guidelines fell short); Donna Hendrickson Christensen & Kathryn
D. Rettig, Standards for Adequacy of Child Support Awards, 16 J. DIVORCE & RE-
MARRIAGE 19, 38 (1991) (reporting that application of Wisconsin guideline would have
provided poverty level of living for only 42.3% of case sample).
19. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 97-98 (reporting that 18 state guide-
lines failed to offer a minimum decent living standards in one middle-income scenario,
21 in another, 31 for a third, and 47 for a fourth; "minimum decent standard of living"
was defined as 150% of the federal poverty level). See also Zweibel & Shillington,
supra note 18, at tbl. 4.1 (reporting that 31% of low middle income custodial parents
did not attain poverty level using both income shares and Melson formulae); Pirog-
Good, supra note 18, at 459 (using one estimate of family expenditure for middle
income family, guidelines in 10 states failed to produce an adequate award; using
another estimate all guidelines fell short.)
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the guidelines reviewed caused children's living standards to decline
by 26 percent while nonresidential parents' improved by 34 percent. 20
Current guidelines fail to avert poverty and living standard loss
largely because they were not designed with these goals in mind. Only
four states utilize guidelines that take poverty prevention as an explicit
aim. 21 None aim to maintain the child's living standard, or even to
equalize living standard loss.
What current guidelines do invariably seek is "continuity-of-
parental-expenditure." This approach, under which support awards are
calculated so as to replicate typical child-related outlay in an intact two-
parent family, is expressed in two different guideline formulae, the
"percentage-of-obligor-income" standard,22 developed in Wisconsin
and utilized by thirteen states,23 and the "income-shares" formula,24
developed under contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, and utilized by more than thirty states.25 Both of these
formulae calculate child support by means of standard child-expense
percentages, derived from one or another consumer expenditure survey,
that vary by the number of children in the family.26 In the four states
that aim for poverty prevention as well as continuity-of-expenditure, a
"primary support" value, designed to meet the minimum needs of one
20. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 37.
21. As of 1994, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, and West Virginia utilized guidelines
based on the "Melson" formula aimed explicitly at poverty prevention. Williams, supra
note 11, at 7.
22. For detailed accounts of this model and its development, see IRWIN GARFINKEL,
ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT 88-101 (1999); Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 11.
23. Williams, supra note I1, at 1, 6 (categorizing state guidelines as of 1994).
24. For detailed accounts of this model and its development, see ROBERT G. WIL-
LIAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES
FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS: ADVISORY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL RE-
PORT II, 65-80 (1987); Robert J. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Sup-
port Orders, 21 FAM. L.Q. 281, 291-95 (1987).
25. Williams, supra note 11, at 6 (categorizing 32 state guidelines as income-shares
type as of 1994).
26. The income shares percentages were based on the one study (THOMAS J. Es-
PENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL EXPENDrrURES
(1984)) believed to be most reliable. For a description of how the Espenshade study
was used to derive the percentages, see WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 67-80, 129-40.
Some income shares guidelines have since been updated to take account of more recent
data developed by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (DAVID M. BETSON,
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF CHILDREN FROM THE 1980-86 CONSUMER
ExPENDrruRE SURVEY (University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty Spe-
cial Report No. 51, December 1990). The percentages utilized in the percentage-of-
obligor income formula were based on a review of the then current research (Jacques
Van der Gaag, On Measuring the Cost of Children, 4 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERV. REV.
77 (1982)). But according to one of the authors of the formula, given the "enormous"
range of estimates, this economic data provided "only a starting point for determining
the percentages." GARFINKEL, supra note 22, at 89.
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adult, is first subtracted from each parent's income; the remainder is
then applied, in proportion to the parents' relative incomes, to the "ba-
sic child support obligation," designed to meet the minimum needs of
one or more children.2 7 If the support obligor still has available income,
a fixed percentage of that income, based on the percentage-of-obligor-
income model, is then added to the basic support obligation.28
B. The Obligor's Self-Support Reserve
Among the guideline formulae, many give the parent's interest in
poverty avoidance significantly more weight than the child's interest.
Most of the income-shares formulae make use of a "self-support re-
serve" for the nonresidential parent, that establishes an income level
(typically the federal poverty level for a one-person household) below
which a lower award than the guidelines would otherwise require is
permitted or presumptively required.29 The self-support reserve feature
of current guidelines is an important reason for their failure to protect
children from poverty. When a self-support reserve is available only
to the nonresidential parent, children are almost certain to bear the brunt
of family dissolution. Yet only the few states which provide the support
obligor with a self-support reserve also provide a comparable support
reserve to the child's household.3°
The self-support reserve concept is hardly a necessary feature of
current guidelines. Indeed, the concept is inconsistent with the goals of
the continuity-of-expenditure approach: Some studies have found that
parents spend approximately the same percentage of household income
on their children at all income levels; others have found that poor par-
ents spend more on their children than their wealthier counterparts;31
27. As of 1994, the primary support values were $220 per month for the first child,
$165 per month for each of the second and third children, and $110 per month for each
additional child. Williams, supra note 11, at 6. The basic support obligation equals the
sum of the children's primary support needs plus actual, work-related child-care ex-
penses. Extraordinary medical expenses are similarly prorated. Id.
28. In 1994, the percentages used in Delaware were 18% for one child, 27% for
two children, 35% for three, 40% for four, 45% for five, and 50% for 6 or more. Id.
at 6.
29. Both the income shares and Melson formulae include a self-support reserve
feature. See Williams, Guidelines, supra note 24, at 305, tbl. 4. The English and Aus-
tralian child support formulae also grant the obligor a self-support reserve. Oldham,
supra note 7.
30. See DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 49-55 (classifying states).
31. See GARFINKEL, supra note 22, at 134 ("No research suggests that... the poor
spend a smaller proportion of income on their children than middle-income fathers.
Indeed, the evidence suggests either that the proportions are about the same or that the
poor actually spend a slightly higher percentage"); ESPENSHADE, supra note 26 (finding
that poor parents spent 26% of their income on one child, while parents with signifi-
cantly higher incomes spent 15.2%).
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none have reported that poor parents spend less. 32 Nor does the self-
support reserve have any counterpart in traditional support law; empir-
ical research has indeed shown that child support awards under discre-
tionary standards were regressive, with low-income parents typically
paying greater proportions of their incomes in child support than high-
income parents.33
C. The Marginal Cost Approach
Eliminating the self-support reserve or extending it to both halves of
the divided family would improve current guidelines' capacities to
avert poverty and a major decline in children's living standards. But
even with this improvement, existing guidelines are incapable of en-
suring income adequacy for children; this incapacity stems from the
fact that the support values they contain are based on the marginal, or
extra, costs associated with a new family member, not the per person
allocation of family resources.
The marginal cost approach, which makes use of one or another
"household equivalence scale," was devised by economists to permit
living standard comparisons when households are not the same size.34
Used in this way, the approach has merit; indeed, researchers could not
have determined that children typically fare poorly in comparison with
their noncustodial parents without use of such a scale. Household
equivalence scales provide a way of determining poverty thresholds
that vary by family size. They also offer a means of predicting how
much more income a family will need in order to add a new member
(a baby, for example) and maintain its current living standard.3 5 No
32. It is for this reason that percentage-of-obligor income guidelines offer no
"break" to low-income parents. See GARFINKEL, supra note 22, at 134.
33. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 462-
69 (1985) (reporting regressive child support awards in California divorce sample);
Garrison, supra note 6, at 718 tbl. 53 (reporting significant negative relationship be-
tween percentage of obligor income awarded in combined child support and alimony
and obligor's income in New York divorce sample); James B. McLindon, Separate But
Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q.
351, 371-72 (1987) (reporting regressive child support awards in Connecticut divorce
sample).
34. For detailed discussions of the limitations of household equivalence scales, see
Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, Adult-Equivalence Scales, Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Well-Being, and Applied Welfare Economics, in INTERPERSONAL COMPAR-
ISONS OF WELL- BEING 164 (Jon Elster & J.E. Roemer eds., 1991); Angus S. Deaton
& John Muellbauer, On Measuring Child Costs: with Applications to Poor Countries,
94 J. POL. EcON. 720 (1986); Arthur Lewbel, Household Equivalence Scales and Wel-
fare Comparisons, 39 J. PUB. ECON. 377 (1989); Julie A. Nelson, Household Equiva-
lence Scales: Theory versus Policy?, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 471 (1993).
35. See, e.g., David Betson et al., Trade-Offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines,
11 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 3 (1992); Blackorby & Donaldson, supra note 34,
at 168; Nelson, supra note 34, at 473.
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matter what their aims, any approach to child support that takes family
size into account will almost certainly rely on a household equivalence
scale.
While household equivalence scales are uncontroversial, continuity-
of-expenditure guidelines make use of them in an unusual way: guide-
line drafters used such scales to determine how much more money a
couple would need to add a child to their family and maintain their
living standard. This figure-the "marginal cost" associated with a
child-is assumed to be the parent's total child-related outlay and is
used as a basis for achieving "continuity" of parental expenditure.
There are a number of problems with this approach. First, because
"the models ... are concerned with the effect of children on the welfare
of their parents .... [they] do not tell us anything about the welfare of
the children themselves." 36 The cost of adding a child to the family
and maintaining the family's living standard does not measure the re-
sources available to the child; indeed, more than 90 percent of typical
family expenditure represents goods such as housing, transportation,
and utility payments that cannot easily be allocated to specific family
members, but which nonetheless benefit each.37 The child's welfare is
thus determined largely by the family's overall level of expenditure,
not the marginal cost of maintaining that standard when a child joins
the family.
Second, because the model looks backward at a family situation that
no longer exists (or, in the case of nonmarital children, that may never
have been)38 it fails to take account of the realities of family dissolution.
Two households cannot live as cheaply as one; the federal poverty level
for a family of three is approximately 50 percent less than that of a
family of one and a family of two. 39 Family dissolution thus assures
36. Panos Tsakloglou, Estimation and Comparison of Two Simple Models of Equiv-
alence Scales for the Cost of Children, 101 EcON. J. 343, 354 (1991).
37. BETSON, supra note 26, at 3 (based on 1980-81 Consumer Expenditure Survey,
90% of total expenditures in families with children represent commodities that could
not be assigned to either children or adults based on the nature of the good).
38. In the United States, most mothers of nonmarital children do not cohabit with
their children's fathers. See Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Children's Experi-
ence in Single-Parent Families: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions,
21 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 256 (1989) (estimating that in the late 1980s only
one quarter of nonmarital children were born to cohabiting couples); Andrew J. Cherlin,
The Weakening Link Between Marriage and the Care of Children, 20 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 302, 303 (1988) (estimating that 22% of white and 12% of black children under
six living with an unmarried mother have mother's cohabitant in home).
39. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1998, 478, tbl. 758 [hereinafter 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]
(reporting 1996 poverty threshold of $8,163 for one individual under 65 and $10,564
for two persons with a householder under 65.) See also Betson et al., supra note 35,
at 4 (noting that, if family's total income is unchanged by divorce, its overall standard
of living must necessarily fall due to loss of economies of scale and shared goods).
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that, given the same total income, one or both portions of the divided
family will experience a living standard decline; for the family that had
barely averted poverty when together, dissolution ensures that some, if
not all, family members will thereafter be poor. While we lack recent
estimates, one expert has estimated that 16 percent of whites and
28 percent of blacks who became poor during the early 1980s as a
result of movement into a female-headed household did so simply be-
cause of the loss of economies of scale.40 Perhaps because of lost econ-
omies of scale, single parents also appear to spend a considerably larger
fraction of their incomes on children than do two-parent households.41
Support guidelines could, of course, take lost economies of scale and
the greater child-related needs of single-parent households into account.
But because of their exclusive focus on the past, continuity-of-expen-
diture guidelines are a poor vehicle for doing so.
Most continuity-of-expenditure guidelines could be revised to
achieve higher awards than they currently produce. For example, one
study revealed that nine continuity-of-expenditure guidelines produced
awards providing children with less than 60 percent of what would be
needed to achieve a living standard equal to that of the noncustodial
parent while three-those of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia-produced awards providing more than 85 percent
of what would be needed.42 The relative success of the Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and District of Columbia guidelines stems, in part, from
the fact that they rely on estimates of child-related expenditure higher
than those contained in most guidelines; two of the three also provide
a fairly generous self-support reserve for the custodial parent.43 But
because of their exclusive focus on the past, no continuity-of-
expenditure guideline is well-adapted to the changed needs of separated
families. Unless supplemented with a basic needs component, they can-
not ensure the child a minimally adequate income even if family income
40. Mary Jo Bane, Household Composition and Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY:
WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 209, 230 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H.
Weinberg eds., 1986).
41. See BETSON, supra note 26, at 55 (based on 1980-86 CPS data, proportion of
total expenditure on two children was 35% in a two-parent and 53% in a one-parent
family); EDWARD P. LAZEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME WITHIN
THE HOUSEHOLD 90, 98 (1988) (based on 1972-73 data, proportion of income expended
on children in a two-child family was 27% in a two-parent and 53% in a one-parent
family). But see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FAMILY ECONoMIcS RESEARCH GROUP,
EXPENDrrURES ON A CHILD BY FAMILIES 10 (1992) (concluding that "expenses on a
child in single-parent households are slightly higher than those in two-parent house-
holds, probably because of economies of scale.")
42. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 22, tbl. 3-D.
43. Id. at 43, 54.
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is sufficient to achieve that goal; if the nonresidential parent earns the
lion's share of the family's income and is required to pay in child
support only the marginal cost of maintaining the intact, two-parent
family's standard of living, the almost certain result is an improvement
in his standard of living, and a decline in that of the child. Continuity-
of-expenditure type guidelines thus "severely penalize children for be-
ing in the custody of a parent who has less income, and reward them.
for living with the parent who has more." 44
II. What Goals Should Support Guidelines Seek
to Achieve? What Can Guidelines
Realistically Accomplish?
A. Continuity-of-Expenditure Guidelines:
Their Goals and Their Adoption
When Congress mandated the development of numerical support
guidelines in the mid-1980s, it did not specify a particular formula or
model. Instead, each state was permitted to make its own decisions on
the normative values that would guide the development of child support
policy, how those values would be ordered, and how they would be
implemented.
Child support experts also offered legislators a variety of policy op-
tions. Some, of course, advocated the "continuity-of-expenditure" ap-
proach.45 Others urged an "equal outcomes" model that would aim at
equal living standards for the child and nonresidential parent.46 And
others urged that the new guidelines seek, above all else, to ensure that
the supported child did not become impoverished as a result of parental
separation. 47 While these approaches garnered the most attention, leg-
44. Betson et al., supra note 35, at 19. See also Laurie J. Bassi & Burt S. Barnow,
Expenditures on Children and Child Support Guidelines, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 478, 494 (1993) ("Requiring the noncustodial parent to maintain his or her
rate of expenditure on the child is likely to result in the child having a lower standard
of living and might still leave the noncustodial parent with a higher standard of living
than he or she enjoyed prior to dissolution.").
45. Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 11; WILLIAMS, supra note 24.
46. Judith Cassetty & G.K. Sprinkle, The ELS (Equal Living Standards) Model for
Child Support Awards, in WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ESSENTIALS OF CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERA-
TIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 329 (1987) [hereinafter
ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT]; Philip Eden et al., In the Best Interests of Children:
A Simplified Model for Equalizing the Living Standards of Parental Households, in
ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra at 353; Isabel V. Sawhill, Developing Normative
Standards for Child- Support Payments, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGA-
TION: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND SOCIAL POLICY 79 (Judith Cassetty ed., 1982).
47. The Family Court of the State of Delaware, Procedure in Deciding Child Sup-
port Cases, reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT
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islators could also have opted for a utilitarian model or one that aimed
at ensuring the child a minimally adequate income.48
In comparing these policy options, it is apparent that they rely on
very different conceptions of the support obligation and thus aim at
altogether different policy goals. 4 9 Childhood poverty, for example, is
strongly associated with public expenditure; 50 support models aimed
exclusively or primarily at poverty prevention are thus focused on the
support obligor's responsibility not to burden the public with his chil-
dren. The other support models policymakers confronted focus pri-
marily on the obligor's obligations to his child and the other parent,
but vary widely in their assumptions about entitlement to parental in-
come: the equal outcomes model, which seeks to achieve equality
among family members, implicitly assumes that each individual is
equally entitled to parental income; the utilitarian approach, which at-
tempts to maximize the aggregate well-being of family members, sim-
ilarly assumes that no family member has a stronger claim to family
income than does any other. The continuity-of-expenditure model, on
the other hand, assumes that a parent's income belongs to the individual
earner rather than the family unit; parental obligation is thus measured
by what the parent has implicitly, through past spending patterns,
volunteered to devote to his child.5' Viewed from this perspective, the
obligor's self-support reserve feature of many continuity-of-
expenditure guidelines finally makes sense; it ensures that the income
owner's needs come first. In adopting continuity-of-expenditure, leg-
islators thus were also adopting a perspective which measures the child
support obligation by what the parent has agreed to pay, rather than
what he owes the public, his child, and the child's other parent.
Particularly in view of the deficiencies of the continuity-of-
expenditure approach as a means of remedying the low support levels
PRACTICE (1986). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT
RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION (1993) (urging adoption of poverty-
focused (Melson type) child support guideline).
48. See, e.g., Betson et al., supra note 35, at 9 (describing utilitarian support for-
mula); Sawhill, supra note 46, at 99-102 (describing two different minimum income
formulae).
49. For a detailed discussion of the normative issues related to child support guide-
lines, see Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models
of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41 (1998).
50. In addition to the costs associated with welfare dependence and other forms of
direct public aid, the adverse consequences associated with childhood poverty trigger
a wide range of costs borne by the public. For estimates of these costs, see NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEw AMERICAN AGENDA FOR
CILDREN AND FAMILIES (1991); HAVEMAN & WOLFE, supra note 1.
51. For a more detailed discussion of the normative assumptions underlying the
continuity-of-expenditure model, see Garrison, supra note 49, at 89-91.
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that were the primary motivation behind the guidelines requirement-
results that could have been predicted by anyone with a calculator in
hand-one obvious question is why legislatures chose such a restrictive
view of the support obligation. Traditional child support law, under
which the support award is based on an assessment of needs, resources,
and the child's prior living standard, clearly relied on a broader con-
ception of the support obligation. Nor does the amount that a parent
did spend on his or her children when the family was intact bear any
obvious or necessary relation to what he should spend now that the
family is separated. Indeed, for the rapidly growing segment of the
support-eligible population born outside of marriage, there is no past.52
Most nonmarital children have never lived in an intact household.53 For
these children, replication of past expenditure patterns is pure fiction.
The choice of the continuity-of-expenditure model over its alterna-
tives appears to have been influenced by a number of factors. One was
the federal government, which both commissioned an economic anal-
ysis of child-rearing costs that produced the income-shares formula and
gave states a relatively short period to meet the guideline requirement;
54
confronted with a federal mandate, very little time to meet it, and a
federally "approved" model, it is hardly surprising that the majority
of states simply fell in line with this approach.55 The evidence also
suggests that many policymakers were poorly informed about the goals
and capabilities of the continuity-of-expenditure approach. A memo-
randum explaining New York's continuity-of-expenditure type guide-
line, for example, describes the primary purpose of child support as
52. In 1996, 32.4% of U.S. births were to unmarried mothers, as compared to 10.7%
in 1970. 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 39, at 76, tbl. 93. As a result of this
trend, the never-married percentage of child support-eligible mothers has risen rapidly.
Compare U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT FOR
CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 1991, at 3 tbl. A (Current Population Reports
No. P60-187, 1993) (showing that 25.9% of custodial mothers were never-married in
1991) [hereinafter 1991 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT] with U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, at 3 tbl. B (Current
Population Reports, Series P- 23, No. 106, 1980) (showing that 19% of custodial moth-
ers were never-married in 1978) [hereinafter 1978 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT].
53. See sources cited in note 38, supra.
54. Only a handful of states and localities utilized guidelines of any description
before 1984 when Congress first required states to utilize advisory support guidelines;
all states were required to adopt guidelines presumptively setting child support values
by October 1989. See Williams, supra note 11, at 1.
55. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Looking for Policy Choices Within an Economic Meth-
odology: A Critique of the Income Shares Model, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT,
supra note 46, at 27-28 (noting that the economic analysis commissioned by the federal
Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) "creates the appearance of scientific,
objective 'truth' " and is "given heightened validity by virtue of OCSE's involve-
ment").
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"the maintenance of the child's standard of living"-a goal, as we
have seen, that this guideline type is simply not designed to meet.56
Misunderstandings about the goals and capacity of continuity-of-
expenditure guidelines were fueled both by false advertising and a
relatively impoverished policy debate. Proponents of continuity-of-
expenditure formulae argued that this approach would significantly
raise support levels without taxing noncustodial parents beyond their
prior child-related expenses. These claims, that offer benefits to chil-
dren, parents, and the public, surely played a role in the model's po-
litical success. Moreover, policy debate seldom focused on basic goals
or specified the linkages between goals and specific guideline formulae.
The principal author of the continuity-of-expenditure approach, for ex-
ample, offered eight "soup-to-nuts" principles to guide the develop-
ment of guidelines-but no evidence that those principles supported
continuity-of-expenditure.
57
In sum, while we can be sure that adoption of the continuity-of-
expenditure model reflected the influence of the federal government
and the not uncommon legislative desire for a no-cost, pain-free solu-
tion, we cannot be sure that its selection was the product of careful
reflection on basic goals and values. We can be sure, however, that
continuity-of-expenditure guidelines cannot be faulted for failing to
significantly raise support awards, avert poverty, ensure a minimum
decent standard of living, or achieve equity among family members;
they do not aim at attaining these goals. If policymakers believe any
or all of these goals to be significant, guidelines must be designed to
achieve them rather than continuity-of-expenditure. In redesigning
guidelines, legislators must first decide what goals they wish to achieve.
B. At What Goals Should Child Support
Policy Aim?
Child support policy raises fundamental issues of fairness: Support
policies allocate the family's most basic resource, its income. The dis-
tribution of that income will largely determine the level of well-being
and opportunities available to each family member as well as the rela-
tive economic burden of child-rearing imposed on each parent; it will
often determine the extent to which the public assumes some or all of
parental support obligations. Support policy should thus be grounded
56. GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL MEMORANDUM: CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS AcT
(1989) reprinted in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 1989, at 250.
57. WILIAMS, supra note 24, at 6-8.
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in contemporary views of parental obligation and fairness among fam-
ily members.
While survey data make it clear that the American public views child
support as a pressing public concern and strongly disapproves of sup-
port obligors who avoid their support responsibilities, there is little data
on public attitudes toward the content of the support obligation. Infor-
mation on this issue is available from only two public opinion polls,
the 1985 Wisconsin Survey of Children, Incomes, and Program Parti-
cipation (CHIPPS) and a 1992 Maryland survey. Neither of these polls
directly investigated attitudes toward support policy goals; 58 instead, in
both surveys, respondents were asked to come up with an appropriate
child support award in different cases. The respondents' answers reveal
something about their attitudes toward child support policy, but, be-
cause they were not asked the basis for their support awards, we cannot
be sure about the goals and values the numbers reflect or whether re-
spondents' initial thoughts on these subjects would have held constant
had they been asked to consciously select among distributive goals and
allocation methods.
Some trends do emerge from the survey results, however: Most re-
spondents appeared to believe that the value of support should not be
restricted to a minimum basic needs package; that the support obliga-
tion should be based on-and updated to take account of -the current
incomes and circumstances of family members; that the support cal-
culation should include a comparative element that takes into account
the circumstances of both segments of the divided family; and that a
parent should contribute something to his child's support even if he is
worse-off than the child.59 While these trends do not definitively point
to any particular policy goal, they undeniably fail to support the con-
tinuity-of-expenditure approach, which ignores the current circum-
stances of family members altogether; they also fail to support an ap-
proach restricted to poverty prevention or a minimum needs package.
They do support an approach that treats the divided family as one fam-
ily, adjusting the support payment in a way that equitably balances the
claims of all family members.
58. Barbara R. Bergmann & Sherry Wetchler, Child Support Awards: State Guide-
lines vs. Public Opinion, 29 FAM. L.Q. 483 (1995); Thomas Corbett et al., Public
Opinion About a Child Support Assurance System, in CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE:
DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLMCAL BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WIS-
CONSIN 339 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1992); Nora Cate Schaeffer, Principles of
Justice in Judgments About Child Support, 69 Soc. FORCES 157, 163 (1990).
59. See Garrison, supra note 49, at 98-101 (describing surveys in detail and as-
sessing what can be learned from them).
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To supplement the published data on public attitudes toward child
support, I recently surveyed a group of law students, who were asked
to "[cihoose the goal you believe most important in formulating a child
support rule." 60 Forty-two percent of the respondents indicated that the
child support award should be set at a level that will "maintain the
standard of living the child enjoyed prior to parental separation;" 58
percent indicated that the support amount should "equalize the living
standard of the child and his or her noncustodial parent." None of the
respondents indicated that child support should be set at an amount that
would "ensure that the child's basic needs are met," "maintain the
noncustodial parent's child-related expenditure at what it would be in
an intact family," or "ensure that the child does not burden the com-
munity by becoming a recipient of public assistance." While a group
of law students is not a representative cross-section of the general popu-
lation6' and answers to specific questions about "factors that a legis-
lature might require courts to take into account in making child support
decisions" indicated some ambivalence about a "pure" equal living
standards goal,62 the respondents' complete rejection of both the con-
tinuity-of-expenditure and poverty-prevention/minimum income ap-
proaches is nonetheless striking and provides strong support for an
approach that focuses on achieving income equity among family mem-
bers.
This conclusion is bolstered by research examining public attitudes
toward sharing and obligation within the nuclear family. Jennifer
Hochschild, who studied American attitudes toward distributive justice
in a wide range of institutions, has reported that within the nuclear
family "strict equality and need predominate ... as norms to which
individuals profess allegiance." 63 While parents often "leaven [their]
focus on equality with discipline," 64 they believe that "[all family]
members deserve equal amounts of the good being divided" and should
"sacrifice equal amounts of satisfaction when necessary." 65 Americans
also continue to rank family obligations as the most important obliga-
60. For a more detailed account of the survey, see id. at 101-02.
61. While the students were a fairly representative group in terms of gender (50.5%
were male, 49.5% female (n=93)), 82% had never been married (n=95), and 91%
had no children (n = 96).
62. See id.
63. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT Dis-
TRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 107 (1981).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 52, 107.
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66 adve sa fetv entions, and view tougher child support laws as an effective means of
strengthening families and family values.
6 7
C. Feasibility: What Goals Can Guidelines Accomplish?
The evidence suggests that many members of the public would voice
support for a child support policy focused on maintaining the child's
standard of living; indeed, boilerplate language in discretionary child
support laws often urged this goal. Living standard equalization or
some other approach aimed at achieving equity among family members
also finds support in the survey data. But before pursuing a support
goal or model, a policymaker must assess its feasibility: If child support
policy is incapable of achieving a particular goal, a legislature should
think twice about using it as a primary basis for guideline revision. In
revising current guidelines, policymakers must keep in mind the
limits-as well as the possibilities-of guideline design.
1. MAINTENANCE OF THE CHILD'S PRE-SEPARATION LIVING STANDARD
Support policy aside, children have typically suffered a major decline
in living standard following family dissolution as a result of two com-
plementary factors: Most children in divided families reside with their
mothers; 68 mothers typically earn less than fathers. 69 The result is that
the larger segment of the divided family-which needs the most in-
come to maintain its living standard-is left with the least.
Child support, which transfers income from the nonresidential parent
to the child's household, could theoretically be calculated so as to re-
quire transfers that would reverse this loss, imposing it entirely on the
nonresidential parent. But our ability to transfer loss from one part of
the family to the other is not, in fact, unlimited. Consider the case of
66. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 105 (1991) (describing results of survey commissioned by Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Company in which most respondents ranked "Being responsible
for your actions," and "Being able to provide emotional support to your family," as
their most important personal values while "Being free of obligation so I can do what-
ever I want to do" came in last.)
67. See Hart & Teeter Research Companies National Telephone Survey of 1592
Adults for NBC News and Wall Street Journal, Question 59 (June 4, 1994) (reporting
that, in response to question on effectiveness of "several actions the government might
take to try to strengthen families and family values," 53% rated "tougher laws to help
collect money from parents who do not make their child support payments" as "very
effective," 31% "somewhat effective.").
68. 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 39, at 66, tbl. 79 (showing that in
1997 5% of U.S. children lived in a father-only household while 27% lived in a mother-
only household).
69. In 1996 the median income of women working full-time outside the home was
$28,363, of men $42,077. Id. at 476, tbl. 753.
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Mr. and Mrs. A, who have six minor children and an annual income
of $30,000, all earned by Mr. A. If Mrs. A assumes sole custody of the
children post-divorce and continues to earn no income, it would be
necessary to transfer $26,763, or 89 percent of Mr. A's income, to
ensure that the children suffer no living standard loss; Mr. A is left with
only $3,237 to meet his own needs.7°
A law requiring transfers of this magnitude would produce several
practical problems. One is enforcement. Researchers report, not sur-
prisingly, that higher support obligations tend to produce a lower per-
centage of support paid.7' Even if Mr. A could somehow be forced to
pay almost 90 percent of his income, his incentive to keep earning
$30,000 per year would be small; why should he work hard to retain
such a small fraction of his earnings?
Another problem arises from the fact that, in order to avert living
standard loss by the children, Mr. A is pushed well below the poverty
line. At this income level, Mr. A's ability to continue earning may well
be impaired. He may be unable to maintain his residence or to keep the
car which he needs to get to and from work; he may even become
eligible for one or another public benefit himself.
Finally, by ensuring (theoretically) that the A children will suffer no
living standard loss, we have also ensured that Mrs. A has virtually no
incentive to earn income herself. Even if the six A children are all in
school and Mrs. A has the credentials to earn a substantial salary, it is
unlikely that she will be highly motivated to do so if she is guaranteed
that her former living standard will be maintained by Mr. A-and the
better the support system is at extracting money from Mr. A, the lower
her incentives will be.
In sum, support requirements that severely tax support obligors cre-
ate significant enforcement problems and work disincentives for both
the noncustodial and custodial parent. In cases like that of the As,
70. The support obligation necessary to maintain the child's living standard was
calculated using the U.S. poverty thresholds for families of varying sizes. For a more
detailed description of the methodology, see Table 1, infra.
71. See, e.g., ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 51 (1993) (concluding that when "fathers ... less
willing or less able to pay ... [are] brought reluctantly into the system by reforms in
the child support enforcement program[, the likely result is] ... a decline in the pro-
portion of awards collected"); Judi Bartfeld & Daniel R. Meyer, Are There Really
Deadbeat Dads? The Relationship between Ability to Pay, Enforcement, and Compli-
ance in Nonmarital Child Support Cases, 68 Soc. SERV. REv. 219, 230 (1994) (re-
porting significant inverse relationship in sample of paternity cases between percentage
of income awarded in child support and likelihood of compliance); Sandra K. Danziger
& Ann Nichols-Casebolt, Child Support in Paternity Cases, 64 Soc. SERV. REv. 458
(1990) (same).
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maintenance of the children's standard of living may ultimately cost
both the A children and the public more than is gained.
The case of the A's is, of course, extreme. Very few support obligors
have six children; the vast majority have one or two. 72 Nor does the
typical single mother have no earned income whatsoever.73 But even
in the typical case, maintaining the children's standard of living will
often create enforcement and work disincentives large enough to out-
weigh the benefits to be gained. Consider the case of the B's, who have
one child. Mr. B earns $20,000; Mrs. B $10,000. In this far more typical
case, maintenance of Child B's living standard would require a transfer
of $15,293, or 75 percent of Mr. B's income.74 While work and payment
disincentives are smaller here than in the case of the A's, they are still
sizeable and would likely preclude living standard maintenance as a
feasible policy goal.
2. EQUALIZATION OF LIVING STANDARD Loss
Equalization of living standard loss, which ensures that both shares
of the divided family bear the brunt of family dissolution to the same
extent, is a more realistic policy goal. Reconsider the case of the B's.
Equalization of living standard loss would require a child support trans-
fer of $6800, or 34 percent of Mr. B's income. While payment and
work disincentives are not negligible, neither are they extreme; indeed,
the maximum percentage (utilized for obligors with several children)
contained in current guidelines is typically set at this level or higher.75
Equalization might still be unrealistic in cases like that of the A
family and in cases of extremely poor support obligors, who will need
to retain sufficient funds to ensure their continued employment. In order
to preserve work incentives for the residential parent, it will also be
necessary to "impute" income to residential parents whose child care
responsibilities permit employment and who have the capacity to con-
tribute significantly to their children's support; some of these parents
may still fail to work and thus prevent living standard equalization. But
while we cannot realistically achieve income equalization in all cases,
this is a feasible goal that we could meet much of the time-and far
more often than we do now.
72. In 1994, only 10% of married couples, 5% of male householders, and 12% of
female householders had three or more children under the age of eighteen living at
home. 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 39, at 63, tbl. 74.
73. The mean total money income of custodial mothers surveyed for the 1991 Child
Support Report, for example, was $18,133 while the mean total child support received
by this group was $3,011. 1991 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 52, at 19 tbl. 2.
74. Calculated by the same methodology used in the A case.
75. See Williams, supra note 11.
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3. CONTINUITY-OF-EXPENDITURE
Continuity-of-expenditure, which ensures that the nonresidential par-
ent continues to pay the marginal cost of childrearing in an intact house-
hold, is also a realistic policy goal. But realization of this aim will also
be limited by work and payment disincentives. Although the combi-
nation of the obligor's self-support reserve and relatively low support
percentages in early guidelines minimized those disincentives, guide-
line revision that maintains the continuity-of-expenditure methodology
and nonetheless seeks to raise awards will, of necessity, increase them.
A number of commentators have noted, for example, that the mar-
ginal expenditure percentages contained in many guidelines lie near or
even below the lowest plausible estimates of child-related expendi-
ture.7 6 If these percentages were revised to conform to the weight of
the evidence and the obligor's self-support reserve were eliminated,
work and payment disincentives would be greatly magnified, especially
for low-income obligors with many children; for a three-child family,
for example, plausible estimates suggest child-related expenditure in
the 40-50 percent range.77 Thus even continuity-of-expenditure-if
based on realistic estimates of family expense patterns-may be unob-
tainable in cases, like that of the A family, where there are many chil-
dren and large disproportion in parental income; it will also be difficult
to realize in the case of extremely poor support obligors, who will need
to retain sufficient funds to ensure their continued employment.
4. POVERTY AVOIDANCE AND A MUNMUM "DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING"
Child support policy can avert a child's poverty only if that poverty
derives from an income loss associated with family dissolution or non-
formation; if the child's parents did not have enough resources to avoid
poverty when together, child support alone cannot remedy the problem.
And, while there is a strong correlation between children's poverty and
family break-up-the poverty rate of children in single-mother house-
holds is approximately five times that of children in married couple
households 78-the evidence suggests that family dissolution is not, in
76. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3.05A, Comment f (Council Draft No. 5, Oct. 6,
1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
77. For example, most estimates suggest that 40-50% of family expenditure is child-
related in a three child family. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 59-62, 357-60
(reviewing estimates).
78. 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT, supra note 3, at 470, tbl.737 (in 1991, poverty
rate of children age six was 12.1% in married couple families and 59.0% in mother-
only families).
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fact, the most important cause of the current high rate of children's
poverty. Indeed, even if the percentage of children living in mother-
only households could be brought back to its 1959 low, experts estimate
no more than a 10 to 20 percent reduction in the current children's
poverty rate.7 9
Family structure has so little impact on children's poverty because
the fathers of children in mother-only households are disproportionately
concentrated at the low end of the income spectrum. 80 Although the
earnings of low-income fathers may rise substantially over time, 8' di-
vorce and nonmarital childbearing are both significantly linked with
low socioeconomic status. Divorce is approximately twice as likely for
couples below the poverty line as it is for the general pool of married
couples,82 and nonmarital parenting is even more highly correlated with
low income.83 Many children in poor single-parent homes would thus
remain poor even if their parents were (re)united.
If support guidelines are incapable of averting poverty among chil-
dren of low-income parents, they are even less capable of ensuring that
79. HERNANDEZ, supra note 1, at 290, 325; (estimating that only 10-20% of chil-
dren's poverty would be eradicated if rate of mother-only households were to fall to
1959 rate); Bane, supra note 40, at 231 (concluding from analysis of 1970s census data
that "perhaps about 15 percent of all poverty could be alleviated by more attention to
the allocation of resources after household splits"); Greg J. Duncan & Willard Rodgers,
Longitudinal Aspects of Children's Poverty, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007, 1017 tbl.
5 (1988)(concluding from analysis of 1968-82 PSID data that 14.9% of children's
descents into poverty resulted from loss of a parent from the home).
80. See HERNANDEZ, supra note 1, at 310-11 (summarizing studies).
81. See, e.g., Elizabeth Phillips & Irwin Garfinkel, Income Growth Among Nonres-
ident Fathers: Evidence from Wisconsin, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 227, 236-37, tbl. 3 (1993)
(for sample male child support obligors with incomes below 150% of the poverty line
and for whom tax records were available, mean incomes of those with nonmarital
children more than tripled and poverty rate declined by 58 percentage points after seven
years; mean incomes of divorced fathers almost doubled and poverty rate declined by
36 percentage points).
82. See WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 152-57
(1993) (summarizing research on the relationship between socioeconomic class and
divorce rates); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FAMILY DISRUP-
TION AND ECONOMIC HARDsIm: THE SHORT-RUN PICTURE FOR CHILDREN 2 (Current
Population Reports, Series P-70, No. 23, 1991) (reporting that among families with
children, 21% of those that experienced the loss of the father from the household during
a two-year survey period were already poor, a poverty rate double that of U.S. married
couple households generally); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
WHEN HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE, AND FORM 18-2 1, tbl. I (Current Popu-
lation Reports, Series P- 23, No. 180, 1992) (reporting that divorce is approximately
twice as likely among sample couples with incomes below the poverty line as compared
to others); Rand D. Conger et al., Linking Economic Hardship to Marital Quality and
Instability, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 643 (1990) (instability in husband's work, a drop
in family income, and a low ratio of family income to family needs increases risk of
divorce).
83. See, e.g., Phillips & Garfinkel, supra note 81, at 234, tbl.2 (showing that 41%
of never-married nonresident fathers with tax records were poor in year before support
action, as compared to 19% of divorced nonresident fathers).
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these children enjoy a minimally adequate (sometimes defined as 150
percent of the poverty level) living standard. No child support policy
can raise the income of a support obligor, nor can it recreate the econ-
omies of scale available to an intact household. Given the dispropor-
tionate number of low-income families among those that experience
divorce or nonmarriage, it is unlikely that even the best child support
guidelines will achieve a dramatic reduction in children's poverty or
welfare dependence.84 Child support policy will inevitably offer the
most benefits to the least needy.
85
While support policy is thus unlikely to have a major impact on
children's poverty, we could do much better at ensuring income ade-
quacy than we do now. For example, among state guidelines in effect
in 1989-90 the Massachusetts guideline did a significantly better job
of ensuring a minimally adequate income than did others; the average
income/poverty ratio under this guideline was approximately 10 percent
higher than that achieved under any other guideline type and, in a range
of "typical" family situations, the guideline provided a "minimum
decent standard of living" in more cases than did any other.86 The
primary reason for this result was simply that the Massachusetts guide-
line explicitly seeks to ensure children a minimally adequate income
and, in order to attain this goal, both grants the residential parent a self-
support reserve and adds to the base, continuity-of-expenditure com-
ponent of the support obligation a minimum income "supplement."
84. See Elaine Sorenson, The Benefits of Increased Child Support Enforcement, in
WELFARE REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IssuEs 56-57 (Isabel V. Sawhill ed. 1995)
(estimating that, even if all noncustodial parents paid child support based on current
guidelines, the public assistance roles would be reduced by only 9% and the poverty
rate by 5%).
85. Focusing on child support as an anti-poverty strategy may also increase the
racial and marital status gap in children's poverty rates. One pair of researchers recently
calculated that with "medium improvements in child support awards and collections"
and award values set pursuant to the Wisconsin "percentage of income" child support
formula white custodial parents would obtain annual gains more than two and a half
times those of black custodial parents. When the net benefits and tax savings of this
program were aggregated by ethnic group, white families obtained a $481 million
annual gain while both black and Hispanic families suffered more than a $200 million
dollar loss. Irwin Garfinkel et al., The Effects of Alternative Child Support Systems on
Blacks, Hispanics, and Non- Hispanic Whites, 1992 Soc. SERV. REV. 505, 518, tbl. 3
(1992) (including any tax changes resulting from changes in earnings, any decreases
in AFDC benefits received, and any increase or decrease in taxes resulting from ag-
gregate cost or savings resulting from legal changes).
86. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 31-32, tbl. 4-E. The Massachusetts
guideline performed better overall and in medium- and high-income families; for low-
income families, however, the Delaware guideline provided the highest income/poverty
ratio for children. Id. at 32. This result may have been due to the fact that the self-
support reserve utilized by the Massachusetts guideline for both parental households
was higher than that of any other state. Id. at 54.
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Thus, although income adequacy will be impossible to attain in many
low-income families, the capacity of guidelines to ensure this goal
could be substantially improved.
In sum, guidelines have real-but limited-potential as a means of
curbing the risks to children in single-parent households. Non-
economic factors are, of course, outside the reach of child support pol-
icy altogether and case processing deficiencies will limit the capacity
of all guidelines to attain their goals. 87 Under any guideline, it will be
necessary to ensure that awards are established, that they are paid, and
that award variation introduced through the negotiation process is re-
duced. 88 Many parents currently fail to accomplish these tasks;89 in-
deed, one researcher has recently estimated that as much as $34 billion
87. For a more detailed account of case processing issues, see Marsha Garrison,
The Goals and Limit of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NExT FRONTIER
(J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold M. Melli eds., forthcoming 1999).
88. Because few divorce actions involve formal adjudication (see, e.g., ELEANOR
E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOcIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 159 (1992) (reporting that 1.5% of cases in California sample
of divorce actions involving minor children were formally adjudicated); Margaret F.
Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Trans-
action Costs, 8 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 279, 294, tbl. 11 (1993) (reporting that
5.38% (Wisconsin) and 10.13% (Virginia) of sample divorce actions went to trial)),
award levels are typically determined by negotiation. But many parents who negotiate
support awards appear to be poorly informed about the relevant legal standards. See,
e.g., Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes:
Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 585, 600 (1987); Herbert
Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 565, 579-81, 584-86.
In a large, and apparently growing, proportion of the cases, lawyer representation is
available to only one-or neither-parent. See generally Jessica Pearson, Ten Myths
About Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 279, 281-82 (1993) (reviewing research); Jane C.
Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 123
(1994) (same). Under these circumstances, the resources and attitudes of each parent
toward the divorce may play important roles in determining child support outcomes
and produce results that bear little relationship to those lawmakers intended. See Mary-
gold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the
Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1155-56, 1168-71 (1988)
(divorcing couples consistently express concern about legal fees and sometimes settle
in order to avoid additional expense; custodial parents who were reluctant to end the
marriage and/or whose spouses were impatient to do so obtained significantly better
child support awards than the mean of the group); Thoennes et al., supra note 12, at
340-41, tbl. 10 (legal representation was significantly correlated with value of child
support award at all income levels); Jay D. Teachman, Socioeconomic Resources of
Parents and Award of Child Support in the United States: Some Exploratory Models,
52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 689, 697, tbl. 3 (1990) (reporting that "both the capacity to
negotiate and motivation are at work determining the likelihood and size of [child
support] awards").
89. More than four out of ten mothers-and almost three-quarters of those never-
married-have not obtained child support awards. 1991 Child Support Report, supra
note 52, at tbl. 1. In 1991, 34.6% of custodial mothers who had not been awarded
reported that they "did not pursue a child support award"; 13.9% reported that they
"did not want child support"; while 20.5% reported that they were "unable to locate
the other parent"; and 16.1% that the "other parent [was] unable to pay." Id. at 11-12,
tbl. F.
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dollars in additional child support could be collected if all children had
support orders and all were fully paid.90
Work and payment disincentives will also impose limits on guide-
lines of all types and probably preclude maintenance of the child's
standard of living as a realistic policy goal. Moreover, while guidelines'
capacity for poverty avoidance and the assurance of a minimally ade-
quate living standard could be improved, it will be severely limited by
the disproportionate number of low-income parents among separated
families. Both equalization of living standards and continuity of ex-
penditure appear to be realistic policy goals, however. While the need
to preserve work and payment incentives will preclude their attainment
in all cases, these goals appear to be achievable in the majority of cases.
III. Assessing the Models
A. Equal Outcomes vs. Continuity of Expenditure
The continuity-of-expenditure approach, while a feasible policy goal,
has had little impact on award levels, the problem that initially moti-
vated congressional action. It also finds little support in survey data
regarding parental obligation. Living standard equalization, or "equal
outcomes," also appears to be feasible; moreover, this approach finds
substantial support in the survey data.
In view of its feasibility and the extent to which it appears to comport
with popular notions of fairness in assessing support, it is striking that
no state has adopted an equal outcomes model. Rejection of equal out-
comes may reflect the view that an individual income producer has a
stronger claim to his assets than do other family members; some experts
have also suggested that policymakers found it "culturally unaccepta-
ble" to define the child support obligation in a way that links a benefit
to the child with an improvement in the economic circumstances of a
former spouse. 91 But some policymakers did endorse the equal outcome
model's basic goals, rejecting it simply because of reservations about
the payment and work disincentives that arise when the model is used
90. Elaine Sorensen, A National Profile of Nonresident Fathers and Their Ability
to Pay Child Support, 59 J. MARRIAGE. & FAM. 785 (1997).
91. See Carol Bruch, Problems Inherent in Designing Child Support Guidelines, in
EssENTIALs OF CHRLD SUPPORT, supra note 46, at 48 ("some policy makers ... find
the possibility of what they term "hidden alimony" onerous enough to justify aban-
doning efforts to protect fully the child's standard of living"); Bassi & Barnow, supra
note 44, at 495 n. 33 ("We suspect the states reject the more generous equity concepts
because the custodial parent would benefit significantly as well as the child ... many
state legislatures would consider such a result to be unfair in that it essentially provides
the custodial parent with the equivalent of alimony as well as child support.").
180 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 33, Number 1, Spring 1999
in cases like that of the A family. The Massachusetts State Child Sup-
port commission, for example, declared its preference for equal out-
comes "as the method that best addressed the [problem of] disparity
of living standards," before rejecting it because of the concern that the
model "would provide a disincentive for both parents to work.",92
The original proponents of the equal outcomes model did not address
these disincentives, but it is certaitly possible to do so. Table 1 com-
pares the results of an income shares guideline incorporating a self-
support reserve for both parents with those obtained under both a
"pure" equal outcomes model and one modified to reduce work and
payment disincentives. The modified equal outcomes model includes
a self-support reserve feature identical to that contained in the income
shares model; it also caps both the initial support percentage and the
percentage of new income available for support at 40 percent. (In order
to fully preserve the work incentives of both parents, the cap applies
to the income of both and income is imputed to parents in appropriate
cases.) The 40 percent cap is consistent with those contained in current
guidelines and income tax rates, but further research would be needed
to determine "optimal" rates.93
The results displayed in Table 1 show, first of all, just how sensitive
guideline models are to the assumptions used to generate a payment
schedule. For example, under the equal outcomes models, remarriage
by the residential parent has a far more dramatic impact on the support
award in Case 1 than in Case 2. The reason is simply that, because the
Case 1 family has less than 200 percent of the combined poverty thresh-
olds for a one and three person family, the U.S. poverty standards were
92. Marilyn Ray Smith & John Laramore, Massachusetts' Child Support Guide-
lines: Model for Development, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 46, at
267, 273. See also Karen Czapanskiy, Foreward, in ESSENTIALS OF CHmD SUPPORT,
supra note 46, at 5-6 (noting that participants at national child support conference
concluded that "the primary goal of child support is to serve the best interests of the
child" and that "[m]any conferees agreed that the best method [of serving the child's
interests] is to seek to equalize the standards of living of the households of the supported
child's parents").
93. The proposed maxima are also consistent with those advocated by a distin-
guished English commentator. See John Eekelaar, Third Thoughts on Child Support,
24 FAM. L. 99, 100-01 (1994), cited in Oldham, supra note 7, at 706, 715 (suggesting
that English maintenance requirement child support percentage be reduced from 50%
to 40% to reduce work disincentives). But as we have very little data on the impact of
child support rates on employment and earnings, a refined estimate of the optimal
maximum support rate would require substantial empirical research. Using "plausible"
labor supply elasticities, economist David Betson calculated the labor supply effect of
switching from a continuity-of-expenditure child support formula to a "pure" equal
outcomes model and concluded, for a family like the B's, that the net effect was a
reduction in total income of about 11%. Betson et al., supra note 35, at 17. But Betson
did. not attempt to calculate the effect of nonpayment incentives nor did he offer an
optimal formula.
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Table 1
Results of Income Shares and Equal Outcomes Child Support Models
Applied to a One-Child Family
($ per Month Child Support & % of Obligor Income),
by Parental Income
TOTAL NET MONTHLY MODEL A* MODEL B** MODEL Ct
INCOME (Income Shares (Pure Equal (Modified Equal
Nonresidential Parent's (N) & with Equal Self- Outcomes) Outcomes)
Residential parent's (R) Income Support $mo.inc. % $ mo./inc. %
NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME Reserves)
STATUS CHANGES $ mo.nc. %
Case 1: $ 1,200
N $ 800; R $ 400 $120/15% $272/34% $120/15%
N's income up 20% ($960) $280/29% $362/45% $184/19%
R's income up 20% ($480) $120115% $228/29% $120/15%
N remarries ($400 new income) $120/15% $800/67% $280/23%
R remarries ($800 new income) $120/15% $ 20/ 3% $ 20/ 3%
Case 2: $3,000
N $2,000; R $1,000 $480/24% $ 680/34% $ 680/34%
N's income up 20% ($2,400) $576/24% $1074/45% $ 840/35%
R's income up 20% ($1,200) $480/24% $ 592/30% $ 600/30%
N remarries ($1000 new income) $480/16% $1000/33% $1000133%
R remarries ($2000 new income) $480/24% $ 450/23% $ 450/23%
Case 3: $3,000
N $1,000; R $2,000 $240/24% $ 0/ 0% $ 50/ 5%
N's income up 20% ($1,200) $288/24% $ 0/ 0% $ 60/ 5%
R's income up 20% ($2,400) $240/24% $ 0/ 0% $ 50/ 5%
N remarries ($2000 new income) $240/8% $1050/35% $800/27%
R remarries ($1000 new income) $240/24% $ 0/ 0% $ 50/ 5%
Case 4: $5,000
N $2,500; R $2, 500 $600/24% $ 550/22% $ 550/22%
N's income up 20% ($3,000) $720/24% $ 855/29% $ 750/25%
R's income up 20% ($3,000) $600/24% $ 355/14% $ 355/14%
N remarries ($2,500 new income) $600/12% $1175/24% $1175/24%
R remarries ($2,500 new income) $600/24% $ 175/ 7% $ 175/ 7%
-MODEL A-For a one-child family, income shares guidelines require a child support award ranging from 18% -24% of net
income; actual child care costs are typically added to the basic award. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 96. To avoid
individualized consideration of child care costs, child support was calculated here at 24% of net income instead of the midpoint
of the percentage range. The self-support reserve was calculated using the 1996 poverty threshold for a one-person family, the
most common calculation basis. See Marianne Takas, Addressing Subsequent Fanilies in Child Support Guidelines, in NEXr
GENERATtON, supra note I1, at 37. Thus in Case I child support was initially calculated as .24 x S1,200 = $288. Because the
residential parent has no income in excess of the self-support reserve, the nonresidential parent is required to pay 100% of that
sum, up to his own self-support reserve. Because the nonresidential parent has only $120 in excess of his self-support reserve, the
initial support award is $120. For obligors with incomes below the self-support reserve, the support percentage is 10%
**MODEL B-Child support was calculated to produce equal income-to-needs ratios for the custodial and noncustodial
household using the 1996 poverty thresholds for nonfarm families with a householder under age 65 if combined income did not
exceed 200% of the combined poverty thresholds for both segments of the divided family (in $1996, $680 per month for one,
$901 for two, $1,052 for three); for families with higher incomes, child support was calculated to achieve equal income-to needs
ratios using the Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS) moderate income budgets in $1,993 ($1,334 for one person, $2,072 for two,
$2,915 for three). U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu OF LABOR STATsnCs, REvIsED EQurvALENCE SCALE FOR EsrtMAATINO
EQutvALENT INCOMES OR BuD T COSTS By FAMuLY TYPE (Bulletin No. 1570-2, 1968).
tMODEL C-Child support was calculated to produce equal income-to-needs ratios for the custodial and noncustodial
household using the 1996 poverty thresholds for families with incomes up to 200% of the combined poverty thresholds for both
segments of the divided family; for families with higher incomes, child support was calculated to achieve equal income-to needs
ratios using the Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS) moderate income budgets. Initial support awards were capped at 40% of net
obligor income; modifications of the initial award were capped so as not to exceed 40% of new income triggering a modification
claim. Each parent has a self-support reserve based on household size. Thus, while the obligor's initial self-support reserve is
$680 per month (a one person household), after his remarriage his self-support reserve increases to $901 (a two-person family).
Thus, in Case 1, the obligor's initial support award equals $120 because this represents all he has available after subtracting the
self-support reserve of $680 from his total income, $800. After his income increases to $960, he has $280 available, but because
the support award may not be increased by more than 40% of new income, his support obligation increases only to $184. After
he remarries he has $299 available ($1,200 total household income-$901 2-person self-support reserve), but because the support
award may not be increased by more than 40% of new income, his support obligation increases to $280.
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utilized to generate income-to-needs ratios while in Case 2, because
total family income exceeds 200 percent of poverty thresholds, the
Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS) moderate income budgets were used.
The BLS and poverty standards employ different underlying household
equivalence scales and thus produce substantially different percentage-
based outcomes. 94 A fully worked-out guideline should probably utilize
transitional percentages instead of shifting abruptly from one to another
scale. Similarly, because the modified income shares and equal out-
comes models utilize similar self-support reserves, they achieve con-
sistent awards for low-income obligors. The results also demonstrate
that the equal outcomes models produce higher initial awards in the
typical case where the nonresidential parent earns a disproportionate
share of family income. But, in contrast to what one might suppose, an
equal outcomes model does not uniformly disadvantage the nonresi-
dential parent. All of the models produce fairly consistent initial awards
when parents have relatively equal incomes and when the nonresident
parent earns the smaller fraction of family income, the equal outcomes
models produce substantially lower awards than does the continuity-
of-expenditure approach. Because of its built-in sensitivity to shifts in
family composition and income, the equal outcomes model also bene-
fits the high-earning nonresidential parent in common circumstances
such as the residential parent's remarriage to an income-producing
spouse.
This built-in capacity for support modification consistent with the
underlying goals and premises of the model is another, frequently over-
94. Household equivalence scales were generated for both the BLS and poverty
threshold income standards using a two-parent, one-child family as a baseline. By
comparing the budgets required for a one-person and two-person family with that base-
line it is possible to determine the percentage of family income needed by the divided
family to maintain the same standard of living. For example, using the poverty thresh-
olds, a divided three-person family requires $680 + $901 per month ($1,581), while
an intact three-person family requires $1,052; to maintain its living standard, the di-
vided family would require 150% ($1,581/$1,052) of its former income. The nonresi-
dential parent requires 65% ($680/$1052) of family income to maintain his living
standard; the residential parent and child 85% ($901/$1052). Equal income-to-needs
ratios can be calculated by dividing the percentage of family income each household
requires to maintain its living standard by the total percentage of family income that
the entire divided family would need to maintain its living standard. Thus, to achieve
equal income-to-needs ratios, the child's household would require 56% (85%/150%)
of total family income, the nonresidential household 44% (65%/150%). Using the same
methodology, the BLS income standards require that 61% of family income go to the
child's household in order to achieve equal income-to-needs ratios; the difference in
percentages is based on the fact that the BLS budgets are moderate, rather than poverty-
level. Use of a different baseline or different budget may produce substantially different
results. See, e.g., DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 10, at 88-89 (describing similar
methodology applied to two-parent, two-child family baseline under BLS and poverty
threshold standards and reaching different results).
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looked, advantage of the equal outcomes approach. The continuity-of-
expenditure approach is focused on the past and thus provides little
guidance to the issues that arise when both segments of the divided
family go their own way, adding (or losing) members and income.95
Such losses and gains are frequent. At least three-quarters of those who
divorce remarry,96 and many have additional children; on average, di-
vorced wives who remarry regain their pre-divorce standard of living. 97
Current state guidelines evidence no consistency on post-divorce shifts
in family composition and income, with the result that both father and
mother often feel that the support law is unfair-and can point to cases
in which the charge seems well-founded. By having the capacity to
consistently take account of changes in family composition in a way
that treats the needs of both parents equally, the equal outcomes model
could enhance the perceived fairness of support law as well as improv-
ing its capacity to increase award levels and children's post-dissolution
living standards.
A modified equal outcomes model is consistent with the evidence
on public attitudes toward the support obligation. Its goals are realistic.
It adapts easily to changing family circumstances. It is easy to under-
stand and administer. Given its range of advantages, it appears to be
the best approach to child support determination currently available.
B. The "Enhanced" Continuity-of-Expenditure
Approach
Despite the various advantages of a modified equal outcomes model,
the most recent evaluation of support guideline models, conducted un-
der the auspices of the American Law Institute (ALI), rejects this model
in favor of an "enhanced" continuity-of-expenditure formula ("en-
hanced model") based on the Massachusetts support guideline. 98 The
ALl analysis is detailed and compendious, including worksheets, illus-
95. See, e.g., Marianne Takas, Addressing Subsequent Families in Child Support
Guidelines, in NExT GENERATION, supra note 11, at 37 (describing various approaches
of current guidelines to acquisition of new dependents by the obligor and noting that
current guidelines "work best in the least complicated cases.")
96. About five-sixths of divorced men and three-quarters of divorced women re-
marry; about half of remarriages take place within three years of divorce. ANDREW
CHERIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 29, 85 (1981); Barbara Foley Wilson &
Sally Cunningham Clarke, Remarriage: A Demographic Profile, 13 J. FAM. ISSUES
123, 131 (1992). Younger women-the group most likely to be custodial mothers-
remarry, on average, more quickly than older women. Id. (reporting that average period
between divorce and remarriage was 1.5 years for women 20-24 and 2.4 years for
women 25-29).
97. See Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Con-
sequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485 (1985).
98. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 76.
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trations, and more than 300 pages of text; it undeniably deserves atten-
tion and undoubtedly will serve as an influential source book for pol-
icymakers revising current guidelines. Because of the care with which
the ALI analysis was conducted, it is worth considering the enhanced
model before rejecting the continuity-of-expenditure approach alto-
gether.
The ALI enhanced model deviates from a typical continuity-of-
expenditure guideline in two important respects: it provides a self-sup-
port reserve for the child's household and it includes a supplement
explicitly designed to enhance the likelihood that the supported child
will enjoy both a "minimum decent standard of living" and a living
standard "not grossly inferior" to that of the nonresidential parent.99
The supplement is expressed as an income percentage and added to the
base, marginal expenditure percentage.1° As the income of the resi-
dential parent rises, the supplement declines:
When the income of the residential parent exceeds the amount necessary
to maintain that parent at a minimum decent standard of living (the in-
come exemption), the preliminary assessment is reduced by the reduction
mechanism. The reduction mechanism employs a fraction in which the
numerator is the residential parent's excess income (income in excess of
the income exemption) and the denominator is the sum of the excess
income and the total income of the nonresidential parent. (As the resi-
dential parent's income increases as a percentage of this sum, so does the
reduction in the preliminary assessment.) The resultant fraction is mul-
tiplied by the preliminary assessment, yielding the amount by which the
preliminary assessment is reduced. The amount due is the preliminary
assessment less the reduction.101
The ALI approach thus starts with a continuity-of-expenditure meth-
odology, but incorporates supplements to "attain the dual objectives of
[income] adequacy and avoidance of gross disproportion [of living
standards]." 1 02 In fact, it achieves approximately equal living standards
in many cases. For example, where the couple have one child, the
nonresidential parent earns $2,000 and the residential parent $1,000,
the support obligation is 36 percent of obligor income, or $720. Using
a poverty level equivalence scale, both parts of the divided family have
almost equal- 191 percent of poverty threshold for the obligor and
188 percent of poverty threshold for the child-living standards.
10 3
99. Id. at § 3.03.
100. Id. at § 3.05B, Comment b.
101. Id. at § 3.05B, Comment B.
102. Id. at 3.05B, Comment c.
103. Id. at § 3.05B, Comment d, Illustration 4.
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However, for higher income families with a similar income gap, the
ALI approach simply reduces the living-standard gap; with a one-child
family in which the nonresidential parent earns $3,000 and the resi-
dential parent $1,500, for example, the living standard gap is approx-
imately 25-30 percentage points, considerably lower than the 90-100
percentage points achieved under a typical continuity-of-expenditure
guideline, but nonetheless significant.' 
4
C. The Enhanced Model vs. the Equal
Outcomes Approach
The ALI report makes it clear that the equal outcomes approach is
the one "most likely to protect children from poverty and to enable
them to enjoy a relatively high standard of living" 105 and stresses that
"in view of the importance of the child's claims and the availability of
an equal living standards measure that would fully satisfy those claims,
the choice of a more modest measure [such as the one the principles
propose] requires persuasive justification." 106 Unfortunately, the report
devotes little space to explaining what factors were found persuasive.
In the few paragraphs allocated to the equal outcomes model, the report
notes that
The equal living standards model, which would generally respond more
amply to the interests of children, presents two difficulties. First, it gives
no weight to the primacy of the earner's claims to his own earnings....
Whether or not this treatment is ethically sound, it would seem culturally
unacceptable and hence politically unrealizable. If this were the only ob-
jection to the equal living standards model, it might be appropriate to
resist the objection .... Yet the equal living standards model suffers from
a more serious defect: It would create substantial work disincentive for
the residential parent... An equal living standards, as compared to a
marginal expenditure model, would reduce total family income by about
11%. Almost all of the reduction would be attributable to reduced resi-
dential parent labor force participation.'0 7
While the ALI rejection of equal outcomes thus appears to rest pri-
marily on concerns about the model's impact on work incentives and
secondarily on the assumption that equal outcomes for parents and
children is "culturally unacceptable," neither of these objections make
104. Id. at § 3.05B, Comment d, Illustration 5.
105. Id. at § 3.04, Comment d(i).
106. Id. at § 3.03, Comment i.
107. Id. at § 3.05A, Comment j. The 11% figure is derived from the calculations
of Betson et al., described in note 35, supra.
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much sense in light of the ALI's own recommendations. First, the draft-
ers of the ALI recommendations clearly understood that any and all
guidelines can be modified to take account of work disincentives; in-
deed, an important feature of the enhanced model is an "imputed"
income" provision designed to do just that. 10 8 As we have seen, an
equal outcomes approach-or any support model-can be similarly
modified. Second, if equal outcomes are "culturally unacceptable," it
would appear that the enhanced model proposed by the ALI should also
be unacceptable. As Table 2 demonstrates, the enhanced model benefits
the nonresidential parent who earns a disproportionate share of family
income in a high-income family (Case 3), but for low- and moderate-
income earners (Cases 1 and 2) and those cases in which parental in-
come is relatively equal (Case 4), the two approaches produce remark-
ably similar initial awards. The enhanced model may aim only at
eliminating "gross disproportion" in living standards, but for many
low- and moderate-income families its results are almost identical to
those that would be achieved by a formula that explicitly aims at elim-
ination of living standard disparity.
The equal outcomes approach holds one clear advantage over the
enhanced model, however: it is conceptually much simpler. As the ALI
reporter herself put it, the enhanced model's "basic measure of child
support is not as susceptible to easy definition as are [standard conti-
nuity of expenditure guidelines and the equal outcomes model]."l°9
The enhanced model also prefers-perhaps unfairly-the interests of
higher-income obligors to those of their low and moderate income
counterparts. Of course, at very high income levels, expenditures are
less likely to benefit children than they will at lower socioeconomic
levels. 110 Continuity-of-expenditure guidelines typically incorporate in-
come maxima above which the guidelines do not apply in order to deal
with this problem;"' either the enhanced model or the modified equal
outcomes model could (and at some income level probably should)
incorporate some such feature. But this issue is not likely to arise within
the $24,000 to $36,000 net annual income range described by Cases 2
and 3, with the result that the enhanced model comparatively disad-
vantages lower income obligors.
108. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at § 3.06B.
109. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04, Comment d(iii) (Preliminary Draft
No. 7, June 1997).
110. See Burt S. Barnow, Economic Studies of Expenditures on Children and Their
Relationship to Child Support Guidelines, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 11, at
18, 26.
111. See id.
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Table 2
Results of Modified Equal Outcomes and "Enhanced"
Continuity-of-Expenditure Child Support Models Applied to a
One-Child Family
($ per Month Child Support & % of Obligor Income),
by Parental Income
TOTAL NET MONTHLY MODEL A* MODEL B**
INCOME (Enhanced Continuity (Modified Equal
NONRESIDENTIAL (N) & of Expenditure) Outcomes)
RESIDENTIAL PARENT'S (R) $ mo.inc. % $ mof/inc. %
NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME
STATUS CHANGES
Case 1: $ 1,200 $120115% $120/15%
N $ 800; R $ 400
N's income up 20% ($960) $280/29% $184/19%
R's income up 20% ($480) $120/15% $120/15%
N remarries ($400 new income) $120/15% $280/23%
R remarries ($800 new income) $120/15% $ 40/ 5%
Case 2: $3,000 $720/36% $680/34%
N $2000; R $1,000
N's income up 20% ($2,400) $864/36% $ 840/35%
R's income up 20% ($1,200) $644/32% $ 600/30%
N remarries ($1,000 new income) $720/24% $1000/33%
R remarries ($2,000 new income) $443/22% $ 450/23%
Case 3: $3,000 $103/10% $ 50/ 5%
N $2000; R $1000
N's income up 20% ($1,200) $155/13% $ 60/ 5%
R's income up 20% ($2,400) $ 62/ 6% $ 50/ 5%
N remarries ($2,000 new income) $103/< 1% $800/27%
R remarries ($1,000 new income) $ 0/ 0% $ 50/ 5%
Case 4: $4,500 $ 930/31% $1200/40%
N $3,000; $ 1,500
N's income up 20% ($3,600) $1145/32% $1440/40%
R's income up 20% ($1,800) $ 859/29% $1128/38%
N remarries ($1,500 new income) $ 930/21% $1500/33%
R remarries ($3,000 new income) $ 930/31% $ 750/25%
$ 660/22% $ 675/23%
Case 5: $5000 $551/22% $ 550/22%
N $5000; R $2,500
N's income up 20% ($6,000) $734/24% $ 750/25%
R's income up 20% ($3,000) $490/20% $ 355/14%
N remarries ($2,500 new income) $551/11% $1175/24%
R remarries ($5,000 new income) $341/14% $ 175/ 7%
-MODEL A-Child support was calculated using the worksheets provided in the ALl PRINCIPLS, supra note 76, at § 3.05B
Enhanced Marginal Expenditure Worksheet.
**MODEL B-Child support was calculated to produce equal income-to-needs ratios for the custodial and noncustodial
household using the 1996 poverty thresholds for families with incomes up to 200% of the combined poverty thresholds for both
segments of the divided family; for families with higher incomes, child support was calculated to achieve equal income-to needs
ratios using the Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS) moderate income budgets. Initial support awards were capped at 40% of net
obligor income; modifications of the initial award were capped so as not to exceed 40% of new income triggering a modification
claim. Each parent has a self-support reserve based on household size. Thus, while the obligor's initial self-support reserve is
$680 per month (a one person household), after his remarriage his self-support reserve increases to $901 (a two-person family).
Thus, in Case 1, the obligor's initial support award equals $120 because this represents all he has available after subtracting the
self-support reserve of $680 from his total income, $800. After his income increases to $960, he has $280 available, but because
the support award may not be increased by more than 40% of new income, his support obligation increases only to $184. After
he remarries he has $299 available ($1.200 total household income-$901 2-person self-support reserve), but because the support
award may not be increased by more than 40% of new income, his support obligation increases to $280.
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Despite these negatives, the enhanced model marks a vast improve-
ment over first-generation continuity-of-expenditure guidelines. For
policymakers who wish to emphasize income adequacy instead of eq-
uity, it represents a viable alternative and deserves serious considera-
tion.
Given that the results of the enhanced model are consistent with an
equal outcomes approach in most cases, even policymakers primarily
concerned with family equity might want to consider the recasting of
the enhanced model as an alternative modified equal outcomes guide-
line. This would simply entail substituting an equal-outcomes calcu-
lation methodology for the more complex method contained in the en-
hanced model, up to the point at which the two models' results diverge.
The resulting guideline would not be a "pure" equal outcomes, but
neither is the one I have outlined; indeed, as we have seen, the need to
preserve work and payment incentives will preclude the adoption of
most "pure" support models. Moreover, while the public opinion evi-
dence suggests that equal outcomes would probably garner consider-
able support as a basic guideline concept, that evidence also suggests
modification of the basic concept in some instances; for example, the
claim that all parents should pay some support even if the obligor is
worse-off than their children appears to have broad public appeal.
Recasting the enhanced model as a modified equal-outcomes guide-
line would enable policymakers to test the limits of the equal outcomes
concept and its applicability in specific fact situations. In many in-
stances, policymakers have found it easier to reach consensus when
they have moved back and forth between broad principles and real
cases; 12 the extent to which the enhanced and modified equal outcomes
model converge on results, even though motivated by different policy
goals, is striking and offers the opportunity to test the level of consensus
on the support obligation in a range of family situations. Ideally, both
models-and other formulae that focus on family equity-should be
compared in a wide variety of factual contexts before a specific guide-
line is adopted.
IV. Conclusion
Current guidelines have failed to have a major impact on award
adequacy and living standard disparity because they were not designed
112. See ALBERT R. JONSON & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A
HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 16-19 (1988) (describing deliberations of National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search); Stephen A. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1988) (describing deliber-
ations of Federal Sentencing Commission).
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with those aims in mind. Revised guidelines must be formulated with
the right goals in order to achieve the right results. Maintenance of the
child's living standard, a goal frequently mentioned in traditional sup-
port laws, is probably an unrealistic aim given the need to preserve
payment and work incentives. Nor can support guidelines substitute for
an antipoverty program; as a result of lost economies of scale and the
disproportionate number of low-income parents among the support-
eligible population, support guidelines are unlikely to have more than
a marginal impact on children's poverty or welfare dependence. Guide-
lines can, however, do better at ensuring income adequacy than they
do now. Equalization of living standard loss is also a feasible policy
goal.
With these goals in mind, it is time to improve current guidelines. A
modified equal outcomes model would do a good job of ensuring in-
come adequacy and family equity. While the ALI "enhanced" model
is harder to understand, its results also represent a major improvement
over current outcomes. By comparing the goals and results of these
models-and others that aim explicitly at achieving equity among fam-
ily members-policymakers are likely to produce workable formulae
that come much closer to representing our considered judgments about
parental obligation and fairness among family members.

